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Abstract 
We analyze how political connections affect depositor discipline in a sample of Turkish banks. Banks 
with former members of parliament at the helm enjoy reduced depositor discipline, especially if the 
former politician’s party is currently in power, but less so if the former politician served as a 
minister. Banks with structural problems are more likely to appoint former politicians, but our 
results remain robust after controlling for selection effects. Ministers may reduce depositor 
discipline less because they signal severe problems and because the additional government deposits 
they bring to the bank during their term tend to depart with them.  
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1. Introduction 
 
For the sake of financial stability, nearly every aspect of the banking business is shaped by 
regulation. Government policy affects the competitive positions, the profitability and the risk taking 
behavior of banks by imposing entry and exit barriers, by setting interest rate ceilings, by directly 
restricting bank activities to a safety set, by guaranteeing deposits and by changing tax rules. Banks’ 
activities and risk taking behavior may also be restricted indirectly by capital, liquidity or leverage 
requirements, accompanied with appropriate monitoring and supervision provisions to ensure 
enforcement of regulations. This set of government-imposed constraints provides strong incentives 
for banks to develop a corporate political strategy that addresses some of these constraints. This is 
especially the case if institutions are weak enough for regulatory bodies to be subject to political 
capture (Hellman et al. 2003).1 Further, the empirical literature suggests that highly concentrated 
and regulated industries (e.g., Masters and Keim 1985; Schuler et al. 2002) characterized by a few 
larger firms (Salamon and Seigfried 1977) are more likely to engage in lobbying and campaign 
activities.2 This suggests that the banking industry, which is typically highly concentrated, regulated 
and dominated by big banking firms, is particularly suited to establish political connections and 
other lobbying activities. One good example of political capture is provided by Laeven (2004) and 
Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2008), who find that generous deposit insurance schemes are mainly adopted 
by countries with poorly capitalized banks as a result of extensive lobbying efforts. 
Besides influencing policymaking through the sector’s lobbying pressures, banks may even 
appoint politically connected directors in order to extract more direct and bank-specific rents from 
the government, that are otherwise unavailable to the bank. In particular, a strong political 
relationship can be considered as an important intangible asset in dismantling bureaucratic 
obstacles, attracting public deposit accounts, and receiving preferential treatment in the form of 
bank-specific reduced supervisory oversight, regulatory forbearance or even bailouts. Depositors 
may even perceive the presence of politically connected banks directors or chairmen as a signal of 
an implicit government guarantee. As a consequence of cheap government funding, more flexible 
                                                 
1 Especially in weak institutional environments, the state has been viewed as a predatory instrument for 
transferring resources from one group to another (e.g., North 1981, Shleifer and Vishny 1998, Olson 2000). 
Hellman et al. (2003) report the emergence of a capture economy in many transition countries, where 
politicians sell rent-generating benefits to private firms. Acemoglu and Johnson (2005), who find that 
institutions that protect against expropriation by politicians and other powerful groups have a first order 
effect in explaining income per capita, have further emphasized the importance of strong institutions. 
2 Consistent with these conjectures, Stigler (1971) argues that industries with substantial political influence 
and cohesiveness circumvent/disrupt government regulation to its advantage. 
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supervisory and regulatory boundaries and the presence of an implicit government guarantee, 
politically connected banks may be expected to be subject to less market discipline from the side of 
depositors. The aim of this paper is testing this conjecture that political connections reduce 
depositor discipline. 
The idea behind market discipline is that investors in bank liabilities actively reward or 
punish banks in function of the banks’ risk taking behavior. In the case of excessive risk taking, 
investors can demand higher returns on bank liabilities or withdraw their funds. The disciplining of 
banks involves both price and quantity adjustments of bank liabilities. By making risk taking more 
costly for banks, depositors restrain banks’ incentives to take excessive risk and hence should 
contribute to the stability of the financial system. This incentive-compatible regulatory design has 
been strongly stimulated by the Basle II reforms. These were partially intended to remedy the moral 
hazard cost of the mispriced government guarantees, inherent to the regulatory design of 1934-
1984 that focused on safety nets and crisis prevention. Market forces can also remedy other 
deficiencies of the supervisory framework, like information asymmetries. Even though bank 
supervisors can conduct on-site examinations, markets may jointly know more than inspections can 
reveal.  
Much of the evidence for depositor discipline comes from countries with mature and 
relatively transparent banking sectors3. Both price and quantity discipline have been shown to 
prevail in the United States’ banking sector, particularly with respect to deposits that are not fully 
insured. A recent study using cross-country panel data from thirty-two OECD countries confirms the 
presence of disciplining behavior in other mature institutional environments (Nier and Baumann, 
2006). Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga (2004) use data from a sample of both OECD and developing 
countries and find a negative relationship between the implicit cost of bank funds and prior period 
measures of bank capitalization, profitability and liquidity. The evidence for quantity disciplining is 
less convincing in their study. Martinez Peria and Schmukler (2001) investigate Central and Latin 
American countries (Argentina, Chile and Mexico) and demonstrate that banks’ deposits increase 
and their deposit rates generally decrease with a reduction in the percentage of non-performing 
loans and improvements in liquidity and capitalization. Karas et al. (2010a) show that surprisingly 
sophisticated and capital-based depositor discipline is also present in a European emerging market 
like Russia.  
By verifying whether depositors impose less discipline on politically connected banks, this 
paper connects two hitherto separate strands of the literature. The deposit insurance literature 
                                                 
3 See, amongst others, Flannery and Sorescu 1996, Park and Peristiani 1998, Calomiris and Powell 2001, 
Evanoff and Wall 2001, Goldberg and Hudgins 2002, Maechler and McDill 2003, and Sironi 2003. 
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suggests that deposit insurance entails a trade-off between greater protection against bank runs and 
an increasing propensity of banks to take on additional risk, because depositors no longer have 
incentives to monitor banks and, hence, do not claim an interest payment commensurate with the 
bank’s risk choice. For instance, Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) find evidence that explicit 
deposit insurance schemes tend to increase the likelihood of banking crises in a sample of 61 
countries over 1980–1997. Most empirical studies do confirm that explicit deposit insurance indeed 
undercuts market discipline. The cross-country study conducted by Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(2004) conveys that the introduction of a blanket guarantee disturbs the market’s incentives too 
deeply to discipline banks through interest rates. Karas et al. (2010b) exploit a natural experiment 
to show convincingly that this is also the case for Russia. On the other hand, Martinez Peria and 
Schmukler (2001) give evidence that small insured depositors still react to bank risk after the 
introduction of deposit insurance. This indicates that depositors are not only concerned about 
individual bank insolvency, but also about the solvency of the insurance fund and the willingness of 
the government to support the insurer (Flannery 1998). These insights may also extend to the effect 
of political connections on market discipline. If political connections imply an implicit government 
guarantee, or increase the likelihood of bailout in any other way, they may disturb efficient price 
formation in deposit markets and hence reduce depositor discipline. This will, however, only occur 
if depositors believe the political connection will help the connected bank to secure government 
support.  
 
Our work is also related to an emerging body of research that focuses on the economic value of 
political connections. Fisman (2001) finds that stock prices of firms connected to Suharto regime 
are negatively affected by rumors about Suharto's health. In a cross-country setting, Faccio (2006) 
examines internationally active firms and finds a positive value effect from the entry of a 
shareholder or director into politics, whereas politicians joining company boards do not increase 
firm value.4 Further, it is documented that firms with political ties enjoy preferential treatments 
such as, soft budget constraints (Claessens et al. 2008 for Brazil; Khwaja and Mian 2005 for 
Pakistan), easier access to government contracts (Agrawal and Knoeber 2001), favorable IPO 
conditions (Francis et al. 2009), relaxed regulatory oversight (Stigler 1971; De Soto 1990) and 
bailout options (Faccio et al. 2006).  In addition, Faccio (2006) finds that favorable treatments in 
                                                 
4 Other papers that found a positive relationship between political connectedness and firm valuation include 
inter alia: Ferguson and Voth (2009) for Nazi Germany and Johnson and Mitton (2003) for Malaysia. 
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association with political connection manifest more in countries with weak property rights 
regimes.5 
Although, in balance, the literature favors the view that close ties with the government is 
offering a helping hand, there are some studies claiming the opposite. In a cross-country setting, 
Boubakri et al. (2008) observe a negative relationship between political connectedness and 
accounting performance. Fan et al. (2007) find that newly privatized Chinese firms with politically 
connected CEOs are associated with poor post-IPO performance.  Qian et al. (2011) find that 
minority shareholders are expropriated by controlling owners through their political connections. 
Bertrand et al. (2007) show that connected French firms pursue political goals by creating jobs at 
the expense of profitability. These results can be explained with the grabbing hand view (Shleifer 
and Vishny 1998), i.e., former politicians are more inclined to divert resources for political and 
personal objectives, rather than for maximizing the value of the firm. This paper differs from above 
studies by examining the economic effect of a bank’s rather than a firm’s political connections. We 
focus on the mechanism of moral hazard. Depositors of politically connected banks may exert less 
discipline on their banks, helping the connected bank to expropriate rents in the form of an 
increasing deposit base and lower funding costs, as compared to its peers. 
 
We employ a unique dataset of 79 Turkish banks from 1980 until 2008, for whom we have data on 
balance sheets, income and expense statements, ownership and political connections. Political 
connections for firms in most of the developing countries like Turkey are mainly established by 
putting politicians on their payroll. This provides us a direct measure of political connectedness of 
the board of directors and is readily observable for depositors, so it may affect market discipline. 
More indirect ways of exerting political power, like electoral campaign contributions, are likely not 
observable by depositors in most countries and can therefore not be expected to affect depositor 
discipline.    
We find that Turkish depositors discipline their banks through the capital ratio. Banks with 
lower capital exhibit lower deposit growth and pay their depositors higher interest rates. The 
introduction of full-blanket deposit insurance fails to reduce depositor discipline significantly, 
suggesting that depositors had less than complete trust in the government’s pledge to guarantee 
their deposits. Political connections affect market discipline. Specifically, depositors exert less 
discipline on their banks when banks’ top executives were formerly elected in parliament, unless 
                                                 
5 The evidence provided by Roberts (1990), Goldman et al. (2009) and Cooper et al. (2010) suggests that the 
value of political connections can also be important for industrialized countries like the U.S., where markets 
are well developed and shareholders enjoy a higher level of legal protection. 
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these served as a cabinet minister. These effects are stronger if the former politician’s party is 
currently in power, lending support to the thesis that the found effect is really driven by political 
connections to a ruling party. Hiring a former cabinet member is less effective in terms of reducing 
market discipline because depositors may perceive it as a signal of implicit structural problems the 
bank can only solve thanks to a former-minister’s political clout. In addition, the new government 
deposits brought by the minister are also fickle and tend to leave the bank with the minister. 
 
We organize this article as follows. The next section describes the sample of banks, discusses the 
methodology of the depositor discipline model, and presents the baseline results. In Section 3, we 
test whether the blanket guarantee scheme affected depositor discipline. In Section 4, we interact 
the bank fundamentals with political connection variables. Section 5 presents robustness checks 
and explore explanations for the results. In Section 6, we verify whether there is a disparity in 
depositor discipline between different types of agents. The last section contains concluding remarks. 
 
2. Data and baseline model of depositor discipline 
 
We collect an unbalanced panel of 79 Turkish banks from the various issues of Banks in Turkey 
published by the Banks Association of Turkey. This publication includes balance sheets and income 
statements for these banks from 1980 until 2008. We chose the year 1980 as a starting point 
because in July of that year the government embarked on a program of financial liberalization and 
removed interest rate ceilings on loans and deposits to increase competition in the banking sector. 
In Appendix 1, we present an overview and short history of the Turkish banking industry. We only 
use public information that is available to depositors.6 Of the 79 banks, 33 banks were classified as 
foreign banks, 50 banks were domestically owned commercial banks and 13 were classified as state-
owned deposit taking banks.7  This study concentrates on commercial banks as they function as 
universal banks (offering a broad range of products and services such as deposit-taking, commercial 
lending, trading financial instruments, insurance, leasing and investment banking), and hence 
operate relatively homogenously. Moreover, we exclude investment banks and State Deposit 
Insurance Fund banks (SDIF banks) from the sample. Our methodological approach is (i) to infer 
whether market discipline is present using evidence from both deposit interest rate and deposit 
                                                 
6 Our data structure is adjusted for mergers & acquisitions by generating a new bank after tracing such events 
via The Banks Association of Turkey, which offers main historical events during the lifetime of operating and 
closed banks. 
7 The sum is more than 79, as we account for changes in ownership type over the sample period. 
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growth regressions, (ii) to address the question whether a full blanket guarantee affects market 
discipline, and (iii) to assess whether political connectedness hampers depositors’ incentives to 
monitor and discipline their banks. Methodological details are provided section by section. 
 
2.1. A baseline model of depositor discipline 
 
We first examine all the bank fundamentals, in order to explore which variables depositors focus on 
when disciplining their banks. The most convincing evidence of depositor discipline would emerge if 
depositors withdraw their funds whenever the asset quality of their bank is no longer satisfactory. 
Consequently, because of this upward shift of the deposit supply curve, the bank will face deposit 
outflows and deposit rate hikes. This is why analyzing both the reactions of deposit prices and 
quantities is important, as only this joint information allows us to disentangle depositor discipline 
from demand shifts or regulatory shocks (Park 1995, Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001, 
Ioannidou and de Dreu 2006, Karas et al. 2010a). A positive relation between bank risk and deposit 
rates could for example also reflect a demand effect rather than discipline, with risky banks 
pursuing a more aggressive expansion strategy to meet new loan demand. But this would be 
revealed by looking at the quantity regression, where the relation between bank risk and deposit 
quantity would also be positive in case of a demand effect, and negative in case of true depositor 
discipline.   
 
Using reduced form equations, the following baseline models are estimated in which we measure 
the reaction of deposits (Eq. 1) and interest rates (Eq. 2) to bank risk taking, respectively:  
DEPG, = α + α, + α, + ε,    (1) 
IDEP, = β + β, + β, + μ,    (2) 
The dependent variables are the traditional measures to evaluate market discipline. The  !",# is 
the first difference of the log of deposits for bank i during period t, whereas $ ",# is the implicit 
interest rate on deposits of bank i at time t. To avoid non-stationarity, the growth rate of the volume 
of total deposits is used instead of its levels. Table 1 provides summary statistics of the numerical 
measures of the dependent variables, bank fundamentals and bank controls for the sample period 
1980-2008. We notice that the average yearly percentage change in deposits has been positive 
across banks and over time (16.20%), however, with a high degree of dispersion (58.48%) showing 
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a substantial difference between minimum and maximum values. On the other hand, the implicit 
interest rate reveals us that the banking sector has historically paid high interest rates on deposits.  
 
In line with the literature, the  represents a vector of accounting measures of bank-specific risk 
characteristics (e.g., Park and Peristiani 1998, Martinez Peria and Schmukler 2001).8 This vector is 
included with a one-year lag to account for publication delay of balance sheet and income statement 
information. Furthermore, this lag structure also helps to reduce potential endogeneity concerns. 
The capital ratio (%&'()) is calculated as the ratio of book value of equity to total assets. This ratio 
serves as a secure cushion against declining bank asset values, and as a signal to outsiders about the 
solvency of the bank.  We expect that this variable will have a positive relationship with deposits 
and a negative linkage with the interest rates, ceteris paribus. The summary statistics in Table 1 
reveal that the average capital ratio in our sample is equal to 12%. The *'%&'+'() variable is equal to 
liquid assets (such as cash, central bank debt and short-term government securities) to total 
deposits. As this ratio measures the bank’s ability to cover deposit withdrawals, we expect a positive 
relationship with deposits and a negative one with the interest rates. The ,-+	/0-12 variable 
proxies for riskier asset management strategy, and is computed as the ratio of loans under follow-up 
to gross loans. As the presence of high non-performing loans ratio is associated with higher credit 
risk, all else being equal, we expect this ratio will have a negative impact on deposit growth and 
positive one on the interest ratio. The 345 is the profit after taxes divided by total assets. As this 
ratio is an indicator of how profitable a bank is relative to its total assets, it gives an idea about 
management’s effectiveness in asset employment. As a consequence, we expect this variable will 
have a positive relationship with deposits and a negative linkage with the interest rate, ceteris 
paribus. To moderate the inordinate influence of extreme values, we winsorize the dependent and 
bank risk variables at the 2% level in both tails.  
 
Strong evidence of market discipline is found when the signs of the estimated coefficients of bank 
fundamentals are opposite in both equations, for example for capitalization α > 0 and β < 0.  The 
disturbance terms ε, and μ, are independently distributed with mean zero and variance σ, . 
Following most prior research, we estimate a model using bank fixed effects,	α, for the deposit 
reaction, and β, for interest rate reaction to control for the unobserved heterogeneity across banks.  
 
                                                 
8 Instead of accounting measures, relying on market information would severely restrict our dataset, since 
most banks in our sample are not listed. 
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The  vector contains other bank specific control variables and macro-political variables 
potentially affecting the reaction variables.  The variable 7'89 is calculated as the natural logarithm 
of the book value of total assets expressed in terms of 1987 prices. The variable 5:9 is a measure for 
institutional maturity, and indicates the number of years the bank exists. The variable ;</=> is 
equal to the average number of employees per branch and is interpreted as a measure of bank 
service quality. Four macro-political variables are included in the model: a government 
fragmentation variable (?>-:;91(), a variable that captures extraordinary military backed 
governments (@0>+'1), the growth rate of real gross national product (,A)A/9)  to control for 
business cycle effects and a banking crisis dummy variable (B>'2'2). The ?>-:;91( measures the 
number of government-parties and is calculated as the monthly weighted number of parties in the 
government in one specific year. In our sample there was one episode of military backed 
governments: the period 1981-1983 due to a military coup. In line with Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Detragiache (2002), the banking crisis dummy variable (B>'2'2) takes the value of 1 in 1982, 1991, 
1994 and 2000 and 0 in other years.  As in Barajas and Steiner (2000) and Mondschean and Opiela 
(1999) we also address the issue of bank ownership in market discipline. We differentiate between 
public, private and foreign banks: Public banks (State-banks) are predominantly owned by the 
government, private banks are domestically owned (Private) commercial banks with more than 
50% of shares owned by Turkish residents and foreign banks (Foreign-banks) are either branches of 
foreign banks or Turkish banks with at least  50% of their shares owned by non-residents. Private 
domestic banks will serve as the reference group.  
 
2.2. Estimation results 
 
Estimation results of Eq. 1 and Eq. 2 are summarized in Table 2. Panel A and Panel B represents the 
results for the quantity and price equations, respectively. In the first four columns of each Panel, the 
four sets of bank risk variables are estimated separately; while the last column of both panels 
presents their joint estimations. If we assume a positive sloped deposit supply curve and a negative 
sloped deposit demand curve, based on the effects of bank fundamentals on deposit growth and 
interest rate, we can infer whether there is a strong presence of market discipline (Park 1995). In 
particular, we are interested in the identification of variables that cause deposit supply shifts. An 
increase in the capital ratio %&'() leads to an increase in deposit growth and a decrease in 
deposit interest rates, i.e., the major effect is a rightward shift of the deposits supply curve 
α > 0	-1+	β < 0. In contrast, a higher liquidity position of the bank *'%&'+'() results in a 
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higher deposit growth, but also in a higher deposit rate, suggesting that liquidity is predominantly a 
demand shifter, rather than a supply shifter. Note that the two remaining risk variables (,-+	/0-12 
and 345) also fail to produce net shifts of the deposit supply curve. 
 
It turns out that only the capital ratio shows convincing evidence of the presence of depositor 
discipline, since it conclusively lead to a shift of the deposit supply curve (i.e., statistical significant 
with the expected and opposite signs in both equations). Specifically, depositors are willing to 
supply more funds to better-capitalized banks at lower interest rates. This suggests that depositors 
put most weight on the capital ratio in evaluating banks’ riskiness. This is not surprising since the 
capital ratio is a simple but a very powerful indicator of bank risk: the capital ratio serves as a 
secure cushion against declining bank asset values. It is also a signal to outsiders about the solvency 
position of the bank to face credit, liquidity, operational, off balance sheet, legal and macroeconomic 
risk. Consequently, more than any other measures, the capital ratio is extensively used as a proxy for 
bank risk taking in market discipline studies both in developed and emerging market economies 
(e.g., Cook and Spellman 1994, Hannan and Hanweck 1988, Park and Peristiani 1998, Martinez Peria 
and Schmukler 2001, Karas et al. 2010a).  
 
Most bank-specific control variables enter the deposit growth equation as well as the interest rate 
equation significantly. The 7'89 variable shows us that banks with larger relative size have a 
competitive advantage as they attract on average more deposits while not having to pay higher 
interest rates. This probably suggests that depositors perceive larger banks as “too big to fail” as 
they perform a key role in the functioning of financial markets and payment system. Furthermore, 
as evidenced by De Jonghe et al. (2012), larger Turkish banks manage their portfolio risk more 
efficiently and reach a more optimal risk/return profile. We notice that Turkish depositors are eager 
to deposit their funds, and accept lower interest rates in exchange for a better client oriented bank 
service quality (;</=>). In order to gain market share in the deposit market, newer banks offer 
higher interest rates than older banks (5:9) in order to attract more deposits. Political 
fragmentation (?>-:;91() is related to higher deposit growth and higher deposit rates, suggesting 
that depositors are willing to save more in times of political uncertainty, but not without asking a 
risk premium to compensate for the higher general uncertainty. All else being equal, crisis years do 
not invoke significant changes in the deposit and in the price equation. We observe that deposits 
increase during the military intervention period (@0>+'1), probably because depositors consider 
deposit accounts a safe haven in troubled times. In good economic times (,A)A/9), banks pay less 
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interest rates on deposits, but do not experience higher deposit growth. State-owned banks pay 
higher interest rates, but still saw their share in the deposit market slide downward. Although 
foreign-owned banks also pay higher interest rates on deposits, it does not improve deposit growth 
significantly. 
 
3. Depositor discipline and blanket deposit insurance 
 
In the following two specifications, bank fundamentals are interacted with a full deposit insurance 
dummy variable in order to examine the impact of a full blanket guarantee on depositor discipline: 
DEPG, = α + α, + α, ∗ DI + αGDI + αH, + ε, (1) 
IDEP, = β + β, + β, ∗ DI + βGDI + βH, + μ, (2) 
where DI is a dummy variable that has a value of 1 for the full blanket guarantee period (1994-
2003) and 0 otherwise. The Turkish government instituted full deposit coverage as a response to 
the collapse of three small banks on May 5, 1994, to reinstate confidence in the banking system. This 
blanket guarantee was in place for a substantial amount of time, and was even reinforced during the 
second major banking crisis in 2000.  With the stabilization of the banking sector in the aftermath of 
the 2000-crisis, the insurance coverage was eventually limited to 50 thousand TL on July 5, 2004, a 
number that still holds as of today (see, e.g., Tanyeri 2010 and Laeven and Valencia 2012 for a 
detailed discussion). 
 
The coefficients of α and β identify the change in depositor discipline induced by the deposit 
insurance. In line with theory and previous empirical literature findings, if the blanket guarantee 
indeed reduced depositor sensitivity to bank capitalization, we expect α < 0 and β > 0. So far, we 
have reached the conclusion that market discipline takes place through the capital ratio as higher 
levels of capital buffers lead to both higher deposit growth and lower deposit rates. Given the 
consistent importance of the capital ratio as the only clear driver of depositor discipline, we focus 
our attention in the remainder of this paper on the capital ratio. Table 3 presents the results of the 
impact of an explicit full blanket guarantee on depositor discipline via the deposits equation and 
price equation (respectively, column 1 and 2 of Table 3). Recall that the coefficient of interaction 
terms %&'() ∗ $ in equations (3) and (4) measures the changes in intensity of market discipline 
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during the full blanket period.9  The results reveal us that the introduction of a full blanket 
guarantee did not have much impact on the intensity of depositor discipline. These finding indicates 
that the adoption of such a scheme was not credible, or that depositors still feared costs related to 
the recovery of deposits in case of failure (i.e., the costs due to late payments and the foregone 
interest earnings).  
 
4. Political connections and depositor discipline 
 
Since the major goal of this paper is to estimate changes in intensity of market discipline after a 
former politician is appointed at the helm of the bank, we estimate the following reduced quantity 
and price equations, respectively: 
 
DEPG, = α + α, + α, ∗ DI + αG, ∗ IJK, +  (5) 
                    αHDI + αLIJK, + αM, + ε,  
 
IDEP, = N + N, + N, ∗ DI + NG, ∗ IJK, +  (6) 
                    NHDI + NLIJK, + NM, + μ,  
 
where IJK is a vector of two sets of bank-specific political connections, i.e., PCON and MIN. 
 
Regression estimations of equations (5) and (6), are reported in Table 3, columns 3 and 4, 
respectively. Given these estimations, we first verify whether depositors perceive a top bank 
executive with past political experience as an implicit government guarantee. The coefficients of αG 
and βG measure the change in intensity of depositor discipline for the period that the politically 
connected person (defined as being a former parliamentarian) is at the head of the bank ( B4O). In 
particular, if there is a reduction in depositor sensitivity to bank capitalization, we would notice  αG 
< 0 and βG > 0. We proceed, in columns 5 and 6, by verifying whether depositors react differently to 
the appointment of former prime ministers or cabinet members (P$O) instead of simple 
parliamentarians.  
 
                                                 
9 Although we estimate the most flexible specification with Equity, Liquidity, Bad loans, and ROA and full set of 
interactions, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we only report Equity and its interaction 
with DI in the discussion of results as only Equity proved to be unambiguously leading to depositor discipline. 
Full results are available upon request. 
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We use data from a variety of sources published by The Grand National Assembly Turkey, i.e., the 
parliament of the Republic of Turkey, to identify political connections. Politically connected bank 
CEOs or Chairmen are sorted into two subgroups. We define political connections ( B4O) as 1 if the 
bank’s head was previously a member of Turkish parliament and/or served as a cabinet member or 
prime minister. The variable P$O is set to 1 if the bank’s head served as a cabinet member (i.e., 
prime minister or any other cabinet member). In our analysis, compared to Faccio (2006), we use a 
more narrow definition of political connectedness as we concentrate on the bank executives that are 
most visible to the public, namely the bank’s CEO and Chairman of the board10. Members of the 
Turkish parliament are retrieved from a three-volume scrapbook, recently published on the website 
of The Grand National Assembly of Turkey (www.tbmm.gov.tr). The album covers in a structured 
way the name, a short biographic note (i.e., date of birth – education level – professional 
experience), and a picture of all the elected parliamentarian in each legislature for the period 1920-
2010.  Cabinet members are retrieved from the historical archives of the Turkish parliament, where 
information about ministerial composition of the past governments is available. The names of 
banks’ CEOs and Chairmen are gathered from the various issues of Banks in Turkey published by the 
Banks Association of Turkey. We crosscheck the names of a bank’s CEO and Chairman with the 
names of cabinet ministers and the names covered in the scrapbook. Names that match are verified 
with biographies available on the Internet and the online archives of various newspapers. Whenever 
we cannot find any information about banking experience of formerly elected parliamentarians, we 
do not consider those names as politically connected in order to avoid overstatements in political 
connections. We focus on the most objective and direct form of political connections, although there 
are other indirect, more opaque forms, of political connections (ranging from politicians’ relatives 
on the board to less subtle forms such as bribery or corruption).   
 
To summarize the above description:  B4O is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a 
bank CEO or Chairman was previously a member of the Turkish Parliament, and 0 otherwise 0; P$O 
is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a bank’s CEO or Chairman was formerly a 
cabinet member or prime minister, and 0 otherwise. According to the definitions above, we detect 
27 politically connected directors spread over 21 banks (20 private commercial banks and 1 state 
bank). The number of bank-year observations for former parliament members is equal to 106, 
whereas this number is equal to 78 for former cabinet members. The average number of years that a 
former politician is at the top of the bank is equal to four years.  
                                                 
10 It is reasonable to hypothize that political connections of other board members will not have any effect on 
market discipline, as these individuals are much less known by the depositors. 
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Table 3, Column 3, shows that the interaction term %&'() ∗  B4O appears in the deposit growth 
equation with a statistically significant negative sign, i.e., causing an enormous reduction to the 
%&'() coefficient.11 Adding up the coefficients (1.9772–2.6785 < 0) reveals us that depositors do 
not impose discipline on the banks at all while the former politician is heading the bank. 
Furthermore, Column 4 indicates that this interaction term enters the interest rate equation with a 
significant positive relationship causing a sizeable increase to the %&'() coefficient (adding up 
coefficients: –0.4204+0.4401). These results indicate that risky, less capitalized banks are attracting 
more deposits and paying lower interest when they appoint a former politician as a Chairman or 
CEO. We interpret these findings as rightward shifts in the supply of deposits to risky, though 
politically connected banks. These findings suggest depositors believe that politically connected 
banks are safer, irrespective of bank fundamentals. 
 
In order to examine possible differential effects between former cabinet members and ordinary 
parliament members, we include triple interaction terms. This strategy enables us to identify the 
separate impact of former cabinet members on depositor discipline. Intriguingly, Column 5 shows 
that the triple interaction term %&'() ∗  B4O ∗P$O enters the deposit equation with a statistically 
and economically significant positive coefficient. Apparently, compared with ordinary 
parliamentarians, the presence of a former minister increases the sensitivity of deposit growth to 
bank capital (1.9741–4.8831 < 1.9741–4.8831+3.4645).  Column 6 shows that this triple interaction 
term also enters the interest rate equation, now with a statistically significant negative impact. 
Compared to ordinary parliamentarians, this finding suggests that the presence of a former minister 
also increases the sensitivity of deposit rates to bank capital (–0.4194+0.8148 > –0.4194+0.8148–
0.6062). The results seem to indicate that political connections induce a far greater reduction in 
market discipline if the political connection is through a former member of parliament rather than a 
former minister. Depositors indeed only seem to reduce their discipline considerably if the 
politically connected person did not serve as a minister. Clearly, the appointment of former 
parliamentarians  conveys a positive signal, as depositors respond more favorable to banks with low 
capital (i.e., high risk bank), increasing the quantity of deposits and/or bringing down the interest 
rates. We see two possible explanations for this unexpected finding with respect to former 
                                                 
11 Although we estimate the most flexible specification with Equity, Liquidity, Bad loans, and ROA and full set 
of interactions, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the results, we only report Equity and its interactions 
with POL in the discussion of our results as only Equity proved to be unambiguously leading to depositor 
discipline. 
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ministers. First, depositors may fear that in banks with former ministers at the helm, using the 
terminology of Shleifer and Vishny (1998), the grabbing hand will impair the helping hand. More 
specifically, depositors may believe that former ministers will extract political benefits at the 
expense of other bank stakeholders. This phenomenon may also be intensified due to the instability 
of the governments in which these people served.12 In Appendix 2, we briefly review the historical 
developments in the Turkish political landscape. An alternative interpretation is that the 
appointment of former cabinet members may convey a negative message concerning the bank’s 
financial health.  Hiring a former cabinet member may be perceived as a signal of otherwise 
unobserved structural problems the bank can only solve with the help of a politically well-connected 
former minister.  In Section 5 we will provide evidence that unhealthy banks are indeed more likely 
to hire former ministers, which is in line with this argument. Later in this section we also show how 
the additional government deposits brought to the bank by the former minister, tend to leave the 
bank upon his/her departure (see Figure 1).  
 
In Eq. 7 and Eq. 8 we examine whether our findings are stronger if the party, the former politician is 
affiliated with, is part of the ruling majority during his/her term at the head of the bank. The 
variable GOV is set to 1 when the party of the politician which is heading the bank is currently in the 
(coalition) government, and 0 otherwise.13 The introduction of the triple interaction term 
QRST ∗  B4O ∗ !4U enables us to examine whether the sensitivity of depositor discipline intensifies 
when the (last) party of the former politician is currently in power (i.e., GOV). The introduction of 
the quadruple interaction terms QRST ∗  B4O ∗P$O ∗ !4U again allows us to differentiate between 
former cabinet members and parliamentarians.14 On the one hand, we observe that depositor 
discipline is completely wiped away for risky, less capitalized banks in periods when the (last) party 
of the politically connected CEO of chairman is currently in power. This reinforces the identification 
of our mechanism of political connections: it is the access to current political power that annihilates 
                                                 
12 A majority of the ex-ministers served in the seventies, a decade of political turbulences and short-lived 
governments with a strong military intervention in politics. Turkey witnessed during that decade many 
coalition governments leading to a seriously undermined public confidence in central authority. The public 
may hold cabinet members responsible for cabinet instability and their presence may therefore not be a good 
signal to depositors. Depositors may have loathed banks that took these former politicians on board and the 
ensuing increased depositor discipline might be partially interpreted as a way of settling the score with 
respect to the former curtailment of democratic rights. 
13 When the affiliated party ceased to exist, we checked whether its successor is in the coalition government 
during the period that the former politician is at the top of the bank. 
14 We estimate the following reduced form equations: V, = α + α, + α, ∗ DI +
αG, ∗ PCON, ∗ GOV, + αH, ∗ MIN, ∗ GOV, + αLPCON, + αMMIN, + α\GOV, +
],, with Y the reaction variables DEPG and IDEP.  
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or even reverses depositor sensitivity to bank capital. This is in line with theories of political rent 
seeking by banks. On the other hand, this effect is again largely absent for former cabinet 
members.15 
 
The previous results raise the question why banks even consider taking these former cabinet 
members on board in the first place. To understand the exact effect of the presence of a former 
cabinet member at the bank, we start by analyzing the evolution of the number of deposit accounts 
of politically connected banks. In Figure 1 we present the average growth rates of the number of 
deposit accounts of banks led by former cabinet members, over the eight-year window [-4, 0, +3] 
surrounding his leave. Since the average tenure is four years, this gives a good picture of the deposit 
flows during and after their term. The years [-4, -1] represent the last four years that the former 
cabinet member is at the top of the bank; the year 0 is the event-year in which the former cabinet 
member leaves the bank; and the years [+1, +3] represent the three years after this person leaves 
the bank. We distinguish between the growth of the number of government deposit accounts and of 
other (i.e., private) deposit accounts. The reason why banks may believe it is useful to have political 
connections with former cabinet members, lies in the dashed line that represents the average 
growth of the number of government accounts in Figure 1. As long as the former politician is still at 
the helm of the bank, the number of government deposit accounts shows robust growth rates. 
Apparently former minister use their political clout to bring in deposits from a variety of 
government organizations. However, this positive effect is annihilated once the former minister 
leaves and the bank loses its political connection, because the number of government deposit 
accounts drops sharply in this event.  Compared with the growth of the number of government 
deposit accounts, the number of non-government deposit accounts (the solid line in Figure 1) 
exhibits lower growth rates before the departure of the former minister, while this is not the case in 
the period after departure. 
 
5. Robustness  
 
In Eq. 5 and Eq. 6 the political connection dummy variables are lagged by one period, hence they are 
predetermined in explaining deposits growth and interest rates, respectively. Furthermore, bank-
fixed effects control for unobserved bank heterogeneity. But there could still be unobserved time-
                                                 
15 Non-significant regression parameters indicated again that the interaction variable B5 × $ did not affect 
deposits growth or interest rates. Therefore, to prevent overspecification, the variables $ and QRST × $ are 
not included in the following models. 
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varying bank-specific variables that aﬀect both deposit growth/interest rates and the bank’s 
propensity to appoint former politicians. This is in line with the argument of Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985), who claim that corporate governance measures can influence performance and vice versa. If 
there is a selection problem, standard linear regression can produce biased estimates for the effects 
of political connections on deposits and interest rates. Similar to Campa and Kedia (2002), 
Villalonga and Amit (2006) we employ the Heckman (1979) two-stage treatment procedure to 
address this potential selection bias. Specifically, we employ a two-step random effects parametric 
approach as discussed by Vella and Verbeek (1999), which is an extension of Heckman’s two step-
procedure to a panel data context. In the first stage, we estimate a random effects probit model in 
which the dummy variable for political connections is regressed against the same controls as in the 
previous analyses, and in addition three parameters that distinguish between banks that hire 
former politicians and those that do not (i.e., conditioning variables).16 We estimate two probit 
models for being politically connected (POL) – the first examines the determinants of appointing a 
former politician (PCON), and the second examines the determinants of appointing a politician who 
served as a cabinet member (MIN). The explanatory variables in both of these selection equations 
are all lagged with one year, and the conditioning variables are: ln#govdep + θ, z-score, and a 
measure for liquidity.  The ln#govdep + θ is equal to the natural logarithm of the total number of 
government deposit accounts (#govdep. We add θ, which is equal to 1, because the existence of 
banks without government deposit accounts would otherwise eliminate observations. The z-score is 
a measure of bank stability and is calculated as z = jklmno/qrsturv.xky.tur , i.e., average capitalization 
zEQ TA⁄ = nql	rk and return on assets (ROA) during the four preceding years over the 4-year 
standard deviation of the return on assets.17 Banks with a lower z-score are considered to be more 
risky, i.e., have a shorter distance to default. The liquidity measure, i.e., Liquid TA⁄ , is defined as the 
ratio of liquid assets to total assets. The results of the first stage are presented in Table 4 – Panel A. 
In the broader definition (PCON), we find that banks with bad liquidity positions are more likely to 
appoint leaders with political connections. However, banks that appoint former cabinet members 
(MIN) may do so in the hope they will use their political clout to remedy some of their profound 
structural problems. In particular, we find that banks with a low number of government deposit 
accounts (see previous section), a lower distance to default, and a lower liquidity position are more 
inclined to hire former ministers, possibly in an attempt to obtain relief for some of their problems.  
                                                 
16 The fixed effects probit model suffers from an incidental parameter problem, which would yield 
inconsistent estimates. 
17 For not losing observations over the sample period 1980-2008, we started calculating the z-scores from 
1977 onwards. 
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The fitted values from the first-stage probit are then employed to generate the correction 
parameter for self-selection (i.e., the inverse of the Mill’s ratio). In the second stage analysis, we 
include the inverse of Mill’s ratios. As depositors react differently to the appointment of cabinet 
members as compared to ordinary parliamentarians, we differentiate between this choice, and 
include the inverse of the Mill’s ratio for being politically connected λu and the inverse of the 
Mill’s ratio for selecting only past cabinet members λj. The results of the second stage 
regression are presented in Table 4 – Panel B. Our earlier findings are robust. We find again 
evidence that there is a reduction in depositor discipline for politically connected banks, and that 
this reduction is mitigated if former cabinet members are appointed. We notice that quantity 
disciplining and price disciplining are reduced with the appointment of former politicians, and that 
this reduction in market discipline is mitigated with the appointment of former cabinet member 
through the quantity equation (Column 1). In the interest rate equation, we observe that market 
discipline is reduced with the appointment of former politicians (Column 3 and 4), and that this 
reduction is annihilated with the appointment of a former minister but only if the affiliated party of 
the former minister is in power (Column 4).18,19 
  
The bank fixed effects in Eq.5 and Eq.6 control for time invariant differences between politically 
connected banks and unconnected banks. The main variable of interest in both of these equations is  
 ∗ IJK, which allows the vector Risk to have a different slope for the period that a former 
politician is at the helm of the bank. However, since bank fixed effects cannot capture differences in 
slope between politically connected and unconnected banks, the concern is that the coefficient 
estimate for the interaction term ( ∗ IJK) is really capturing the differences between banks 
                                                 
18 Some papers (e.g., Karas et al. 2010a, Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 2004) argue that, in emerging 
economies, depositor discipline is displayed more through the quantity equation rather than the price 
equation as these markets fail to price risk properly because of lack of transparency and asymmetric 
information. 
19 The two-step random-effects estimator assumes that the error terms measuring bank specific random 
effects in both equations are not correlated. As both errors mirror bank’s non-observable heterogeneity, this 
assumption may be violated. To test the robustness of our findings, we also use Woolridge’s (1995) consistent 
estimator model for panel data. In the first stage, instead of random effects probit, we estimate a pooled probit 
model (with standard errors corrected for clustering at the bank level) in determining the determinants of 
POL. These results are very similar as in Panel A of Table 4.  In the second stage, instead of random effects 
model, we estimate a pooled OLS model (with standard errors corrected for clustering at the bank level). For 
the quantity equation, this approach yields similar conclusions as in Panel B of Table 4 concerning the 
sensitivity of market discipline with respect to political connections. For the interest equation, the interactions 
of Equity with political variables (PCON and MIN) preserve the same signs, but they lose some significance. 
The replication of Column 4 with pooled OLS indicates that the coefficient of Equity x PCON x GOV is 
significantly negative, while the coefficient of Equity x MIN x GOV is positive but not significant. The findings of 
this exercise are available on request. 
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that never have a political connection and banks that do. To overcome this concern, as an additional 
robustness check, the Risk vector included in the previous regressions is allowed to have a different 
slope for politically connected banks (i.e., POLBANK).20 The  4*,5O variable is equal to 1 for all 
21 banks that ever hired a former politician in the sample period, and 0 otherwise.21 To be more 
precisely, we estimate the following reduced form models: 
DEPG, = α + α, + α, ∗ POLBANK +    (7) 
                                                        	αG, ∗ IJK, + αHIJK, + αL, + ε, 
IDEP, = N + N, + N, ∗ POLBANK +    (8) 
                                                        	NG, ∗ IJK, + NHIJK, + NL, + μ, 
 
Regression estimations of equations (7) and (8), are reported in Table 5. The coefficients α and β 
capture the possible difference in slope for banks that ever appointed a former politician (i.e., 
POLBANK).  The coefficients of αG and βG measure the change in intensity of depositor discipline for 
the period that the politically connected director is at the top of the bank (PCON). In particular, if 
there is a reduction in depositor sensitivity to bank capitalization after the appointment of the 
political connection, we would notice  αG < 0 and βG > 0. Secondly, in columns 5 and 6, we again 
verify whether the appointment of former prime ministers or cabinet members (MIN) is perceived 
differently. We confirm our earlier finding that depositor discipline is reduced for politically 
connected banks, but this reduction is less dramatic with the appointment of former cabinet 
members. 
 
6. Depositor discipline and the number of deposit accounts 
 
While our preference for the quantity equation is the first difference of the log of real value of 
deposits, this was only possible for total deposit liabilities. However, since Turkish data distinguish 
various deposit categories only via the number of accounts rather than the volumes, we will 
reproduce our results for the quantity equation with the growth of the number of diverse deposit 
                                                 
20 Dinç (2005) uses a similar approach as a robustness check in his empirical analysis of government bank 
lending in election years. 
21 Compared to banks that never hired a former politician as a chief-executive in the sample period (i.e., 
POLBANK = 0), we observe that banks that banks that ever hired a former politician (i.e., POLBANK = 1) are on 
average older (50.33 years) and greater in size (i.e., the natural logarithm of total assets in 1987 prices = 
13.27), but employ less personnel per branch (24.30).  
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accounts. For the entire sample period, we can distinguish between the following number of deposit 
accounts: firm deposits, savings deposits, and interbank deposits.  These categories enable us to 
verify whether there is a disparity in depositor discipline between different types of agents, and 
how each one reacts to the appointment of a former politician at the head of the bank. Therefore, we 
estimate the following reduced form equation:  
 
#I, = α + α, + α, ∗ IJK, + αGIJK, + αH, + ε, (9) 
 
where #I is a vector capturing the growth in the number of deposit accounts of different 
agents. We consider the following four sets of variables: #SAVDEPG is the growth in the number of 
savings deposits; #FIRMDEPG  is the growth in the number of firm deposits; #BANKDEPG is the 
growth in the number of bank deposits; and #PRIVDEPG is the number of private deposits (with 
private deposits equal to the sum of savings deposits, firm deposits and bank deposits). The results 
are reported in Table 6. We find some interesting differences in the disciplining behavior between 
agents. The findings in column 1 indicate that private depositors discipline banks in function of their 
capitalization, and that the disciplining sensitivity diminishes with the appointment of a former 
politician, unless he was a former cabinet member. These results are in accordance with the 
negative signaling hypothesis and in line with our previous findings. We see a similar reaction from 
firms when banks appointment former politicians. The holders of savings deposit accounts become 
extremely vigilant when the bank appoints a former cabinet member, but they do not have more 
faith in banks appointing parliamentarians. Interbank discipline is more than other agents realized 
through Equity (coefficient estimates are higher than for other agents), and banks do not attach 
value to the appointment of former politicians. 
 
7. Conclusions 
 
Rather than evaluating the impact of political connections through wealth effects, we attempt to 
extend our knowledge of the impact of political connections on depositor loyalty by employing a 
depositor discipline framework.  This approach allows us to verify how the average depositor reacts 
once the bank appoints a former politician. A strong political relationship can be considered as an 
important intangible asset for banks in several ways.  We test whether politically connected banks 
are less subject to market discipline by depositors.  
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We find that appointments of former politicians affect depositor discipline substantially. Specifically, 
depositors discipline their banks less when banks’ top executives were formerly elected in 
parliament. This is especially the case when the former politician’s party is currently in power, 
providing further evidence that our results indeed identify a political channel. However, this 
reduction in depositor discipline is partially or fully mitigated when the politician concerned also 
served as a cabinet minister. This could be due to the fact that many of these former ministers were 
part of controversial governments, soliciting negative reactions by depositors. But we also provide 
evidence that banks are more likely to appoint former ministers if they are less liquid and closer to 
default, suggesting that appointing a minister may also send a bad signal of otherwise unobserved 
bank health to depositors. In addition, the additional government deposits former ministers attract 
during their term at the bank tend to leave the bank upon their departure. All our results with 
respect to the effect of political connections on depositor discipline are robust to controlling for 
possible selection effects.  
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Appendix 1: Turkish Banking System 
Initiated in 1980, the financial liberalization reforms abandoned almost immediately interest rate 
ceilings, removed quantitative controls on lending, facilitated bank entry and stimulated financial 
innovation. Since the banking reforms, Turkish banking system experienced a troublesome 
transformation from government dominancy to private competition and dealt with two minor (in 
1982 and 1991) and two major banking crises (in 1994 and 2000). Turkish commercial banks 
operate as universal banks (offering a broad range of products and services such as deposit-taking, 
commercial lending, trading financial instruments, insurance, leasing and investment banking) that 
are largely homogenous. Before liberalization, the banking sector has been significantly under state 
control and practically no new banks were allowed to be founded in this period. There were interest 
rate ceilings on deposits and loans and maximum limits on loan sizes in line with the pursued 
import substitution strategy.  In an environment of non-price competition, bank competition was 
heavily focused on customer convenience leading to the race in the establishment of larger bank 
networks in order to raise more deposits. Table A1 illustrates that the average number of branches 
increased by almost 390 % and the average number of employees rose by more than 400% between 
1963 and 1980. These rates of increases, however, decelerated after 1980.  After the liberalization of 
the market, the number of banks operating in the Turkish banking sector increased significantly 
because the large demand of  profitable public borrowing and the presence of a full blanket deposit 
guarantee attracted a considerable number of new entrants.  The number of banks sharply dropped 
from more than 50 to only 33 in the aftermath of the 2000/2001 financial crisis. This shakeout 
occurred through the liquidation of banks with a weak capital basis and through voluntarily 
mergers and acquisitions. Despite decreasing bank numbers, the banking assets grew massively 
after the crisis from $118 billion in 2002 to about $ 460 billion in 2008. With regard to ownership, 
commercial banks can be classified as public, domestic or foreign banks. The Turkish banking 
landscape changed after the liberalization of the market because of mergers and acquisitions, new 
entries and privatizations. As of 2008, there were 33 deposit-taking banks, 3 of which were state-
owned banks, 17 private domestic banks and 13 foreign banks. Although the share of public banks 
in total assets continues to decline gradually, its impact is still high compared to EU averages. The 
presence of foreign banks used to be limited because of the unstable environment and entry 
barriers. However, the sector has recently beckoned the interest of foreign banks because of the 
strong growth potential and the solid economic recovery. The Turkish banking system still offers 
strong growth potential compared with EU countries. In the future, the environment of sustainable 
growth potential, relatively high margins, low inflation and declining intermediation costs are 
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expected to support further growth in total assets, commercial loans and deposit volumes of the 
banking system, leading to a long overdue process of financial deepening.  
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Appendix 2:  Turkish political environment 
Political instability accompanied with an increasing level of social disorder was the hallmark of the 
post-1960 military regime.  The military coup in Turkey of 1960 was a coup d'état staged by some 
officers against the democratically elected government of the then Adnan Menderes-led Democratic 
Party. The coup occurred primarily as a response for the erosion of military and civil bureaucracy 
power in the Menderes era. The 1961 constitution was reoriented toward the preservation of the 
status-quo and sought to impose significant institutional constraints (e.g., establishment of a second 
parliamentary chamber and a constitutional court with powers to invalidate government policy) on 
the government’s discretion (Tachau and Heper 1983).  These constraints produced huge rigidities 
on the system, and are believed to be partly responsible for the political instability as governments 
seemed powerless to remedy (Esfahani 1996). The 1960 coup consolidated the military’s hold on 
the country. In 1971, after the military ultimatum, under the assistance of military forces a new 
coalition cabinet was formed following the increasing left- and right-wing violence.  
From 1980 till 1983, the legislative process was again derailed by another coup d’état as a 
response to political fragmentation, radical left and right doctrines, uncompromising attitudes of 
political parties and unstable governments. The military junta returned power to civilians with the 
general elections held on November 6, 1983 and the Motherland Party, or ANAP, headed by Turgut 
Özal, won the elections with an absolute majority, defeating the parties favored by the military 
caretakers. In the Özal-era the country initiated a staged transformation towards an open economy 
and turned away from an inward-looking import substitution strategy. From October 1991 general 
elections till October 2002 general elections, the various coalition governments, frequently with 
opposing ideologies, proved to be weak and divided. Turkey faced in the period two economic crises 
episodes. In the 1994 crisis, three banks were confiscated after the sharp devaluation of domestic 
currency due to the unsustainable domestic borrowing policy, high inflation and high level of 
current account and budget deficit. To avoid a systemic crisis a full blanket deposit guarantee was 
introduced to cover both Turkish Lira and foreign currency denominated deposits. This blanket 
guarantee has not been lifted until 2001 after another and much deeper economic crisis in 2000 hit 
the country.  
The 2000/2001 crisis was a classic twin crisis, caused by growing macroeconomic 
imbalances. Ultimately, the government was forced to abandon the euro-dollar crawling peg it had 
primarily initiated to tackle high inflation and had to face the collapse of the banking system. In a 
reaction, the government adopted a comprehensive reform program supported by the World Bank 
and IMF. An important part of this program was the establishment of the Banking Regulation and 
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Supervision Agency (BRSA) which became more effective in prudential supervision and regulation 
with the appropriate enforcement power, credibility and autonomous structure in the post-crisis 
period. Private banks were forced to strengthen their equity capital, either independently or 
through mergers and acquisitions, and about 20 fragile banks that failed to comply were transferred 
to the State Deposit Insurance Fund. It is widely believed that the introduction of full insurance 
coverage on deposits fuelled an unreasonable competition between financial institutions at the 
expense of sound banking practices and was one of the main causes that triggered the crisis in 
2000/2001 (BAT, 2009).  In November 2002 Turkish voters punished the governing parties, for 
their economic mismanagement, and pinned their hopes on Erdogan, the leader of Justice and 
Development Party (AKP). Table A2 presents an overview of the parties in power after the 1960 
coup d’état.  
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Figure 1: Average growth curve of the number of government and private deposit accounts around 
the period that former cabinet member leave office. 
 
 
The graphical representation of the average growth rates of the number of deposit accounts (i.e., #DEPG) 
around the period that former cabinet members leave office, over a seven-year window [-4, 0, +3]. We make a 
distinction between the growth rates of government deposit accounts (#GOVDEPG, dashed line) and other, i.e., 
private, deposit accounts (#PRIVDEPG, solid line). The years [-4, -1] represent the last three years that the 
former cabinet member is at the top of the bank; the year 0 is the event-year in which the former cabinet 
member leaves the bank; and the years [+1, +3] represent the three years after this person leaves the bank.  
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Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Description Mean Std. Dev.
Dependent variables
DEPG The first difference of the log of real (expressed in 1987 prices) deposits 0.1620 0.5848
IDEP Annual interest expenses divided by total deposits 0.2860 0.3177
Bank risk variables
Equity Ratio of book value of equity to total assets 0.1198 0.1267
Liquidity
Ratio of liquid assets (cash, central bank debt, and short-term securities) to total 
deposits
0.7018 1.0631
Bad Loans Ratio of loans under follow-up to gross loans 0.1128 0.3205
ROA Ratio of profit after taxes to total assets 0.0267 0.0510
Political variables
PCON
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when bank’s top executive was 
previously a member of Turkish parliament, and otherwise 0
0.0857 0.2713
MIN
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a bank’s top executive was 
formerly a cabinet or prime minister, and otherwis 0
0.0631 0.2353
GOV
Dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when the (last) party of the former 
politician is currently in the government, and otherwise 0
0.0452 0.2011
POLBANK
Dummy variable that equals to 1 for banks that ever hired a former politician in 
the sample period, and otherwise 0
0.3243 0.4682
Control variables
Size Natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (expressed in 1987 prices) 12.2648 2.0765
Age The number of years the bank exists 37.4472 32.3565
Emplbr Ratio of total number of employees to total number of branches 36.6424 141.0743
Fragment Monthly weighted number of parties in the government in one specific year 1.8635 1.1167
Xordin
Dummy variable equals to 1 during the extraordinary military government 
period (1981-1983), and otherwise 0
0.0920 0.2891
Bcycle Growth rate of real gross national product 0.0417 0.0490
Crisis
Banking crisis dummy variable, which takes the value of 1 in 1982, 1991, 1994, 
and 2000, and otherwise 0
0.1508 0.3580
State-banks Banks that are predominantly owned  (> 50% of shares) by the government 0.1357 0.3426
Foreign-banks
Either branches of international operating banks, or banks predominantly 
owned by non-residents. 
0.3386 0.4734
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Table 2: Testing for the presence of depositor discipline 
 
The estimated equations are DEPGi,t = αi + α1i,t−1 + α2i,t + εi,t and IDEPi,t = βi +
β1i,t−1 + β2i,t + μi,t.  Dependent variables: the  ! is the first difference of the log of real 
(expressed in 1987 prices) deposits; the $  is calculated as the annual interest expenses divided by total 
deposits. Bank risk variables: the %&'() is the ratio of book value of equity to total assets; the *'%&'+'() is 
the ratio of liquid assets (cash, central bank debt, and short-term securities) to total deposits; the ,-+	/0-12 is 
the ratio of loans under follow-up to gross loans; the 345 is the ratio of profit after taxes to total assets. To 
moderate the inordinate influence of extreme values, we winsorize abovementioned dependent and bank risk 
variables at the 2% level in both tails. Bank controls: the 7'89 is the natural logarithm of the book value of 
total assets (expressed in 1987 prices); the 5:9 is the number of years the bank exists; the ;</=> is the ratio 
of total number of employees to total number of branches; the ?>-:;91( is the monthly weighted number of 
parties in the government in one specific year; the @0>+'1 is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 
during the extraordinary military government period (1981-1983), and otherwise 0; the ,A)A/9 is the growth 
rate of real gross national product; the B>'2'2 is a banking crisis dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in 
1982, 1991, 1994, and 2000, and otherwise 0; State-banks are banks that are predominantly owned (> 50% of 
shares) by the government; Foreign-banks are either branches of international operating banks, or banks 
predominantly owned by non-residents. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the 
bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Panel A Panel B
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Equity 1.9622*** 1.8866*** Equity -0.2271** -0.3205**
(0.280) (0.373) (0.109) (0.126)
Liquidity 0.1619*** 0.1335*** Liquidity 0.0645*** 0.0733***
(0.032) (0.035) (0.020) (0.020)
Bad loans 0.1660*** 0.0664 Bad loans -0.0290 -0.0109
(0.052) (0.058) (0.028) (0.020)
ROA 0.7343 -0.1740 ROA 0.1965 0.1935
(0.584) (0.633) (0.206) (0.181)
Size 0.1708*** 0.1214*** 0.1225*** 0.1029*** 0.1658*** Size 0.0157 0.0261* 0.0169 0.0198 0.0118
(0.029) (0.025) (0.025) (0.026) (0.028) (0.016) (0.014) (0.018) (0.017) (0.016)
Age -0.0202*** -0.0134*** -0.0133*** -0.0112*** -0.0173*** Age -0.0059** -0.0067*** -0.0057* -0.0061** -0.0043*
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Emplbr 0.0002*** 0.0002*** 0.0003*** 0.0002*** 0.0002*** Emplbr -0.0001** -0.0000*** -0.0001** -0.0000** -0.0001**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fragment 0.0346** 0.0129 0.0071 0.0032 0.0328** Fragment 0.0246** 0.0310*** 0.0254** 0.0276** 0.0241**
(0.016) (0.013) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.011) (0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.009)
Xordin 0.2029*** 0.2207*** 0.1929*** 0.2085*** 0.2341*** Xordin -0.0593** -0.0447** -0.0516* -0.0529** -0.0377
(0.060) (0.058) (0.055) (0.056) (0.057) (0.027) (0.022) (0.028) (0.026) (0.023)
Bcycle -0.2503 -0.0078 -0.0293 0.0158 -0.2615 Bcycle -0.3294* -0.3927** -0.3521** -0.3562** -0.3475**
(0.342) (0.364) (0.370) (0.370) (0.343) (0.168) (0.167) (0.176) (0.169) (0.168)
Crisis 0.0506 -0.0024 0.0400 0.0331 0.0173 Crisis 0.0287 0.0127 0.0262 0.0296 0.0079
(0.054) (0.056) (0.059) (0.058) (0.055) (0.021) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021) (0.023)
State-banks -0.5819*** -0.4765** -0.5434*** -0.4949** -0.5761*** State-banks 0.1715** 0.1685** 0.1730** 0.1610** 0.1883**
(0.207) (0.197) (0.203) (0.193) (0.207) (0.077) (0.074) (0.075) (0.079) (0.085)
Foreign-banks -0.0543 -0.1171 -0.0671 -0.0765 -0.0940 Foreign-banks 0.1299* 0.1140* 0.1310* 0.1307* 0.1068*
(0.087) (0.106) (0.097) (0.094) (0.101) (0.078) (0.064) (0.077) (0.077) (0.062)
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1,252 1,252 1,237 1,252 1,237 No. of observations 1,256 1,252 1,239 1,256 1,237
R² 0.144 0.105 0.046 0.043 0.184 R² 0.049 0.093 0.037 0.043 0.106
DEPG IDEP
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Table 3: Impact of blanket deposit guarantee and political connections on depositor discipline 
 
Dependent variables: the  ! is the first difference of the log of real (expressed in 1987 prices) deposits; 
the $  is calculated as the annual interest expenses divided by total deposits. Bank risk variables: the 
%&'() is the ratio of book value of equity to total assets; the *'%&'+'() is the ratio of liquid assets (cash, 
central bank debt, and short-term securities) to total deposits; the ,-+	/0-12 is the ratio of loans under 
follow-up to gross loans; the 345 is the ratio of profit after taxes to total assets. To moderate the inordinate 
influence of extreme values, we winsorize abovementioned dependent and bank risk variables at the 2% level 
in both tails. Deposit insurance effects: the $ takes the value of 1 for the full deposit insurance period 1994-
2003, and otherwise 0. Political connectedness effects: the  B4O is equal to 1 when bank’s top executive 
was previously a member of Turkish parliament and/or served as a cabinet member or prime minister, 0 
otherwise; the P$O is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a bank’s top executive was formerly 
a cabinet member or prime minister, and 0 otherwise; the GOV variable takes the value of 1 when the affiliated 
party of the former politician is currently in the government, and 0 otherwise. We estimate the most flexible 
specification with Equity, Liquidity, Bad loans, and ROA and full set of interactions, in order to facilitate the 
interpretation of the results, we only report Equity and its interactions with POL (i.e., PCON and MIN) and DI 
in the discussion of our results as only Equity proved to be unambiguously leading to depositor discipline. 
Bank controls: the 7'89 is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (expressed in 1987 prices); 
the 5:9 is the number of years the bank exists; the ;</=> is the ratio of total number of employees to total 
number of branches; the ?>-:;91( is the monthly weighted number of parties in the government in one 
specific year; the @0>+'1 is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 during the extraordinary military 
government period (1981-1983), and otherwise 0; the ,A)A/9 is the growth rate of real gross national 
product; the B>'2'2 is a banking crisis dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in 1982, 1991, 1994, and 
2000, and otherwise 0; State-banks are banks that are predominantly owned (> 50% of shares) by the 
government; Foreign-banks are either branches of international operating banks, or banks predominantly 
owned by non-residents. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the bank level. ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
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DEPG IDEP DEPG IDEP DEPG IDEP DEPG IDEP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Equity 1.9442*** -0.4143*** 1.9772*** -0.4204*** 1.9741*** -0.4194*** 1.9600*** -0.4226***
(0.427) (0.114) (0.434) (0.115) (0.435) (0.116) (0.433) (0.118)
Equity x DI 0.3129 0.0956 0.2817 0.1000 0.2819 0.0998 0.3438 0.1493
(0.617) (0.241) (0.624) (0.242) (0.624) (0.243) (0.550) (0.224)
Equity x PCON -2.6785*** 0.4401* -4.8831*** 0.8148***
(0.826) (0.248) (0.818) (0.230)
Equity x PCON x MIN 3.4645*** -0.6062*
(1.149) (0.350)
Equity x PCON x GOV -8.3372*** 2.4896***
(0.865) (0.359)
Equity x PCON x MIN x GOV 7.3287*** -1.9750***
(0.812) (0.440)
Size 0.1799*** 0.0067 0.1775*** 0.0067 0.1831*** 0.0066 0.1830*** 0.0074
(0.028) (0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.028) (0.015) (0.028) (0.016)
Age -0.0213*** -0.0032 -0.0202*** -0.0030 -0.0210*** -0.0029 -0.0210*** -0.0028
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
Emplbr 0.0002*** -0.0000* 0.0002*** -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000 0.0002*** -0.0000*
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Fragment -0.0327 0.0368*** -0.0342 0.0365*** -0.0374 0.0368*** -0.0272 0.0443***
(0.023) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.023) (0.013) (0.018) (0.010)
Xordin 0.2092*** -0.0285 0.2164*** -0.0301 0.2185*** -0.0315 0.2267*** -0.0301
(0.055) (0.022) (0.056) (0.022) (0.057) (0.022) (0.057) (0.023)
Bcycle 0.1904 -0.4655*** 0.1713 -0.4716*** 0.1692 -0.4707*** 0.1390 -0.5024***
(0.346) (0.175) (0.347) (0.176) (0.347) (0.176) (0.363) (0.174)
Crisis -0.0195 0.0214 -0.0227 0.0213 -0.0211 0.0218 -0.0233 0.0244
(0.051) (0.020) (0.052) (0.020) (0.052) (0.020) (0.051) (0.020)
State-banks -0.5608*** 0.1955** -0.5424*** 0.2045** -0.5211*** 0.2051** -0.5229*** 0.2026**
(0.207) (0.087) (0.200) (0.089) (0.186) (0.091) (0.184) (0.089)
Foreign-banks -0.0248 0.0888 -0.0229 0.0902 -0.0225 0.0901 -0.0218 0.0902
(0.106) (0.062) (0.107) (0.062) (0.107) (0.063) (0.108) (0.062)
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237
R² 0.218 0.139 0.223 0.140 0.227 0.140 0.225 0.140  
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Table 4: Testing for depositor discipline through Heckman two-stage treatment effects 
 
Panel A is the 1st Step of Heckman 2-step Treatment model. Dependent variables: the  B4O is equal to 1 
when bank’s top executive was previously a member of Turkish parliament and/or served as a cabinet 
member or prime minister, 0 otherwise; the P$O is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a 
bank’s top executive was formerly a cabinet member or prime minister, and 0 otherwise. Explanatory 
variables are all lagged with one year and include: the ln#govdep + 1 is equal to the natural logarithm of 
the total number of government deposit accounts (#govdep; the z-score is a measure of bank stability and is 
calculated as z = jklmno/qrsturv.xky.tur , i.e., average capitalization z
Equity
Total	Assets
 and return on assets (ROA) during the 
four preceding years over the 4-year standard deviation of the return on assets; the Liquid TA⁄ , is defined as 
the ratio of liquid assets to total assets;  the 7'89 is the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets 
(expressed in 1987 prices); the 5:9 is the number of years the bank exists; the ;</=> is the ratio of total 
number of employees to total number of branches; the ?>-:;91( is the monthly weighted number of parties 
in one specific year; the @0>+'1 is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 during the extraordinary 
military government period (1981-1983), and otherwise 0; the ,A)A/9 is the growth rate of real gross national 
product; the B>'2'2 is a banking crisis dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in 1982, 1991, 1994, and 
2000, and otherwise 0. Standard errors are in parentheses. ∗∗∗ indicates significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 
5% level, and ∗ at the 10% level.   Panel B is the 2nd Step of Heckman 2-step Treatment model. Dependent 
variables: the  ! is the first difference of the log of real (expressed in 1987 prices) deposits; the $  is 
calculated as the annual interest expenses divided by total deposits. Bank risk variables: the %&'() is the 
ratio of book value of equity to total assets; the *'%&'+'() is the ratio of liquid assets (cash, central bank debt, 
and short-term securities) to total deposits; the ,-+	/0-12 is the ratio of loans under follow-up to gross loans; 
the 345 is the ratio of profit after taxes to total assets. To moderate the inordinate influence of extreme 
values, we winsorize abovementioned dependent and bank risk variables at the 2% level in both tails. 
Political connectedness effects: the  B4O is equal to 1 when bank’s top executive was previously a member 
of Turkish parliament and/or served as a cabinet member or prime minister, 0 otherwise; the P$O is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a bank’s top executive was formerly a cabinet member or 
prime minister, and 0 otherwise; the GOV variable takes the value of 1 when the affiliated party of the former 
politician is currently in the government, and 0 otherwise. We estimate the most flexible specification with 
Equity, Liquidity, Bad loans, and ROA and full set of interactions, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the 
results, we only report Equity and its interactions with POL (i.e., PCON and MIN) in the discussion of our 
results as only Equity proved to be unambiguously leading to depositor discipline. Bank controls: the 7'89 is 
the natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (expressed in 1987 prices); the 5:9 is the number of 
years the bank exists; the ;</=> is the ratio of total number of employees to total number of branches; the 
?>-:;91( is the monthly weighted number of parties in the government  in one specific year; the @0>+'1 is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 during the extraordinary military government period (1981-
1983), and otherwise 0; the ,A)A/9 is the growth rate of real gross national product; the B>'2'2 is a banking 
crisis dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in 1982, 1991, 1994, and 2000, and otherwise 0; State-banks 
are banks that are predominantly owned (> 50% of shares) by the government; Foreign-banks are either 
branches of international operating banks, or banks predominantly owned by non-residents; the λu is the 
inverse of the Mill’s ratio for being political connected; the λj is	 the inverse of the Mill’s ratio for selecting 
only past cabinet members. Standard errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the bank level. ∗∗∗ 
indicates significance at the 1% level, ∗∗ at the 5% level, and ∗ at the 10% level. 
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Coef. St. Err. Coef. St. Err.
ln(#govdep+1), t – 1 -0.1188 (0.077) -0.1970* (0.114)
z-score, t – 1 -0.0075 (0.005) -0.0120* (0.007)
Liquid/TA, t – 1 -2.5039*** (0.795) -2.3431** (1.008)
Size, t – 1 -0.2346* (0.122) 0.0861 (0.167)
Age, t – 1 0.0061 (0.010) -0.0118 (0.014)
Emplbr, t – 1 -0.0117 (0.011) -0.0671*** (0.020)
Fragment, t – 1 -0.3301*** (0.108) -0.5651*** (0.159)
Xordin, t – 1 0.4888* (0.288) 0.6874* (0.376)
Bcycle, t – 1 -1.6480 (2.416) -1.3479 (3.330)
Crisis, t – 1 -0.2634 (0.297) -0.0813 (0.385)
Constant 0.6876 (1.376) -1.7311 (1.837)
Random-effects Yes Yes
R² 0.259 0.293
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Equity 0.9427*** 0.9381*** -0.2251* -0.2260*
(0.338) (0.335) (0.127) (0.127)
Equity x PCON -3.8833*** 0.4313*
(0.954) (0.225)
Equity x PCON x MIN 3.9631*** -0.4511
(1.264) (0.476)
Equity x PCON x GOV -7.9430*** 1.3333***
(0.974) (0.383)
Equity x PCON x MIN x GOV 8.4947*** -1.1700*
(1.058) (0.600)
Size 0.1409*** 0.1408*** -0.0533*** -0.0533***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.008) (0.008)
Age -0.0053*** -0.0054*** 0.0014*** 0.0014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Emplbr -0.0076*** -0.0077*** 0.0050*** 0.0050***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
Fragment 0.0105 0.0123 0.0332*** 0.0336***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008)
Xordin 0.2253*** 0.2384*** 0.0048 0.0080
(0.045) (0.045) (0.021) (0.021)
Bcycle 0.1402 0.1503 -0.5601*** -0.5614***
(0.351) (0.350) (0.172) (0.173)
Crisis 0.0382 0.0368 -0.0159 -0.0157
(0.046) (0.046) (0.015) (0.015)
State-banks -0.2024*** -0.1984*** 0.1348*** 0.1355***
(0.062) (0.059) (0.050) (0.051)
Foreign-banks -0.0950** -0.0964** 0.0700** 0.0703**
(0.046) (0.046) (0.034) (0.034)
-0.3169*** -0.3202*** 0.1740*** 0.1740***
(0.039) (0.039) (0.022) (0.022)
0.1898*** 0.1929*** -0.1046*** -0.1045***
(0.036) (0.036) (0.018) (0.018)
Random-effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,198 1,198 1,198 1,198
R² 0.336 0.335 0.357 0.358
Panel A: 1st Step of Heckman 2-Step Treatment Model
PCON, t MIN, t
Panel B: 2nd Step of Heckman 2-Step Treatment model
DEPG IDEP
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Table 5: Different slopes for politically connected banks 
 
Dependent variables: the  ! is the first difference of the log of real (expressed in 1987 prices) deposits; 
the $  is calculated as the annual interest expenses divided by total deposits. Bank risk variables: the 
%&'() is the ratio of book value of equity to total assets; the *'%&'+'() is the ratio of liquid assets (cash, 
central bank debt, and short-term securities) to total deposits; the ,-+	/0-12 is the ratio of loans under 
follow-up to gross loans; the 345 is the ratio of profit after taxes to total assets. To moderate the inordinate 
influence of extreme values, we winsorize abovementioned dependent and bank risk variables at the 2% level 
in both tails. Political connectedness effects: The  4*,5O variable is equal to 1 in all years for banks that ever 
hired a former politician in the sample period, and 0 otherwise; the  B4O is equal to 1 when bank’s top executive 
was previously a member of Turkish parliament and/or served as a cabinet member or prime minister, 0 
otherwise; the P$O is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a bank’s top executive was formerly 
a cabinet member or prime minister, and 0 otherwise; the GOV variable takes the value of 1 when the affiliated 
party of the former politician is currently in the government, and 0 otherwise. Bank controls: the 7'89 is the 
natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (expressed in 1987 prices); the 5:9 is the number of years 
the bank exists; the ;</=> is the ratio of total number of employees to total number of branches; the 
?>-:;91( is the monthly weighted number of parties in the government in one specific year; the @0>+'1 is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of 1 during the extraordinary military government period (1981-
1983), and otherwise 0; the ,A)A/9 is the growth rate of real gross national product; the B>'2'2 is a banking 
crisis dummy variable which takes the value of 1 in 1982, 1991, 1994, and 2000, and otherwise 0; State-banks 
are banks that are predominantly owned (> 50% of shares) by the government; Foreign-banks are either 
branches of international operating banks, or banks predominantly owned by non-residents. We only report 
Equity and its interactions with POL (i.e., PCON and MIN), although we estimate the most flexible specification 
with Equity, Liquidity, Bad loans, and ROA and full set of interactions, in order to facilitate the interpretation 
of the results. The coefficients on the control variables are also not reported to simplify presentation. Standard 
errors (in parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
 
 
 
DEPG IDEP DEPG IDEP DEPG IDEP
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Equity 1.8483*** -0.3267** 1.8519*** -0.3269** 1.8516*** -0.3261**
(0.398) (0.134) (0.399) (0.134) (0.399) (0.134)
Equity x POLBANK 0.8660 0.2496 0.7825 0.2622 0.6155 0.2447
(0.620) (0.191) (0.609) (0.192) (0.621) (0.191)
Equity x PCON -3.1373*** 0.1115 -4.7101*** 0.5517***
(0.779) (0.216) (0.530) (0.202)
Equity x PCON x MIN 2.7685*** -0.6623*
(0.777) (0.344)
Equity x PCON x GOV -7.5843*** 1.5253***
(0.934) (0.368)
Equity x PCON x MIN x GOV 6.7081*** -1.4689***
(0.872) (0.423)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
No. of observations 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237 1,237
R² 0.191 0.109 0.193 0.109 0.191 0.109  
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Table 6: Testing for the impact of political connections on depositor discipline for different agents 
 
Dependent variables: the #SAVDEPG is equal to the growth in the number of savings deposits; the #FIRMDEPG  is equal 
to the growth in the number of firm deposits; the #BANKDEPG is equal to the growth in the number of bank deposits; and 
the #PRIVDEPG is equal to the growth in the number of private deposits (with private deposits equal to the sum of savings 
deposits, firm deposits and bank deposits). Political connectedness effects: the  B4O is equal to 1 when bank’s 
top executive was previously a member of Turkish parliament and/or served as a cabinet member or prime 
minister, 0 otherwise; the P$O is a dummy variable which takes the value of 1 when a bank’s top executive 
was formerly a cabinet member or prime minister, and 0 otherwise. Bank controls: the 7'89 is the natural 
logarithm of the book value of total assets (expressed in 1987 prices); the 5:9 is the number of years the bank 
exists; the ;</=> is the ratio of total number of employees to total number of branches; the ?>-:;91( is the 
monthly weighted number of parties in the government in one specific year; the @0>+'1 is a dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 during the extraordinary military government period (1981-1983), and otherwise 
0; the ,A)A/9 is the growth rate of real gross national product; the B>'2'2 is a banking crisis dummy variable 
which takes the value of 1 in 1982, 1991, 1994, and 2000, and otherwise 0; State-banks are banks that are 
predominantly owned (> 50% of shares) by the government; Foreign-banks are either branches of 
international operating banks, or banks predominantly owned by non-residents. We only report Equity and its 
interactions with POL (i.e., PCON and MIN), although we estimate the most flexible specification with Equity, 
Liquidity, Bad loans, and ROA and full set of interactions, in order to facilitate the interpretation of the results. 
The coefficients on the control variables are also not reported to simplify presentation. Standard errors (in 
parentheses) are corrected for clustering at the bank level. ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 
1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
  
 
# PRIVDEPG # SAVDEPG # FIRMDEPG # BANKDEPG
(1) (2) (3) (3)
Equity 1.1376*** 0.9815*** 1.0341*** 1.1753***
(0.191) (0.271) (0.228) (0.428)
Equity x PCON -3.5403* -4.4386 -3.2160** -1.1226
(2.101) (3.083) (1.555) (3.346)
Equity x PCON x MIN 4.6179** 5.7076* 3.9239** -0.1860
(2.216) (3.150) (1.969) (3.661)
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes
Bank-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1,231 1,157 1,222 1,138
R-squared 0.102 0.062 0.060 0.028  
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Table A1: Overview of the Turkish banking system 
public 
share 
(%)
commercial 
share (%)
foreign 
share 
(%)
average 
number of 
branches
average 
number of 
employees
assets/GNP 
(%)
1963 64.4 28.9 4.3 35.8 668.8 16.1
1970 49.6 29.5 3.0 69.4 1434.1 18.3
1980 44.1 44.2 2.9 138.5 2914.2 31.4
1981 42.5 47.2 2.9 138.8 2812.5 37.2
1982 41.8 47.3 3.2 132.4 2737.4 41.7
1983 47.0 42.2 3.7 139.6 2965.7 45.2
1984 47.8 41.6 4.1 132.0 2865.0 45.3
1985 47.6 43.6 3.6 125.4 2764.0 43.9
1986 43.1 45.3 3.8 115.4 2606.8 49.4
1987 44.2 44.9 3.1 114.6 2660.6 55.1
1988 43.1 43.8 3.6 108.8 2521.0 52.9
1989 45.4 42.3 3.1 106.3 2468.8 47.3
1990 44.6 43.2 3.5 99.4 2334.7 42.9
1991 42.3 45.8 3.3 99.6 2352.3 46.6
1992 43.1 46.0 3.7 89.9 2127.9 50.2
1993 36.9 52.3 3.8 89.2 2056.9 52.5
1994 39.5 49.3 3.0 91.1 2075.3 52.0
1995 37.7 52.0 2.9 91.8 2129.3 52.2
1996 38.3 52.7 3.0 93.4 2147.1 59.8
1997 34.6 55.4 4.7 94.7 2150.9 65.9
1998 34.9 53.3 4.4 98.3 2219.9 68.8
1999 34.9 49.5 5.2 95.0 2148.0 92.1
2000 34.3 47.5 5.4 99.2 2157.0 82.9
2001 32.4 56.3 3.0 113.2 2254.0 94.3
2002 31.9 56.2 3.1 113.1 2282.8 77.3
2003 33.3 57.0 2.8 119.3 2465.0 70.0
2004 34.9 57.4 3.4 127.2 2649.2 71.4
2005 31.4 59.7 5.2 132.9 2814.0 81.6
2006 29.6 54.8 12.2 148.9 3111.8 84.2
2007 29.2 52.3 15.0 165.6 3446.4 86.5
2008 30.4 54.1 14.8 195.3 3813.3 87.1
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Table A2: Post 1960 elections and governments in Turkey 
Date of the elections Duration of the government Parties in the government
15.10.1961 30.05.1960 - 28.10.1961 Military intervention
20.11.1961 - 01.06.1962 CHP + AP
25.06.1962 - 02.12.1963 CHP+YTP+CKMP+BG
25.12.1963 - 13.02.1965 CHP+Indep.
10.10.1965 20.02.1965 - 22.10.1965 AP+CKMP+MP+YTP
27.10.1965 - 27.10.1969 AP+CKMP+MP+YTP
12.10.1969 03.11.1969 - 14.02.1970 AP
06.03.1970 - 12.03.1971 AP
26.03.1971 - 03.12.1971 Extraordinary
11.12.1971 - 17.04.1972 Extraordinary
22.05.1972 - 10.04.1973 Extraordinary
14.10.1973 15.04.1973 - 16.12.1973 AP+CGP
26.01.1974 - 16.09.1974 CHP+MSP
16.11.1974 - 31.03.1975 Temporary (N)
05.06.1977 31.03.1975 - 21.06.1977 AP+MSP+MHP+CGP
21.06.1977 - 03.07.1977 CHP(N)
21.07.1977 - 31.12.1977 AP+MSP+MHP
05.01.1978 - 17.10.1979 CHP+BG+CGP+DP
12.11.1979 - 12.09.1980 AP(minority)
22.09.1980 - 24.11.1983 Military intervention
06.11.1983 13.12.1983 - 21.12.1987 ANAP
29.11.1987 21.12.1987 - 09.11.1989 ANAP
09.11.1989 - 23.06.1991 ANAP
23.06.1991 - 20.11.1991 ANAP
20.10.1991 21.11.1991 - 25.06.1993 DYP+SHP
25.06.1993 - 05.10.1995 DYP+SHP/CHP
05.10.1995 - 30.10.1995 DYP+SHP/CHP
24.12.1995 30.10.1995 - 06.03.1996 DYP+SHP/CHP
06.03.1996 - 28.06.1996 ANAP+DYP
28.06.1996 - 30.06.1997 RP+DYP
30.06.1997 - 11.01.1999 DSP+ANAP+DTP
18.04.1999 11.01.1999 - 28.05.1999 DSP(Minority)
28.05.1999 - 04.11.2002 DSP+MHP+ANAP
03.11.2002 18.11.2002 - 14.03.2003 AKP
14.03.2003 - 29.08.2007 AKP
22.07.2007 29.08.2007 - AKP
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
